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Summary findings
Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa remain dependent  such a policy. Moreover, if an export tax is imposed on
on a few primary commodities - coffee, cocoa, cotton,  Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the greatest benefits may
sugar, tea, and tobacco - for a large share of exrort  go to producers in other regions such as Asia and Latin
earnings. Because demand for these commodities is price-  America.
inelastic, production  and export expansion can depress  Individually, few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have
world prices and hence reduce net export revenuc.  sufficient market power to influence commodity prices i
Akiyama and Larson discuss the effects of this  the long run. Possible exceptions include COte d'lvoire
phenomenon  - the adding-up problem - on policy and  (in cocoa) and to a lesser extent Ghana (in cocoa), Kenya
development strategies for major agricultural export  (in tea), and Malawi (in burley tobacco). Export taxes
commodities in Sub-Saharan Africa.  may prove beneficial for these countries but, at certain
They conclude that, as a practical matter, it is not  levels, the primary effect of "optimal" taxes is to transfer
feasible to design a regional commodity production  and  resources from smallholders to governments with limited
trade policy for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole because of  marginal velfare gains.
the difficulty of equitably distributing the benefits of
This paper-a  product of the International Trade Division, International Economics Department-.is  part of a larger effort
in the department to assess policy effects  on international trade. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Anna Kim, room S7-038, extension 33715 (41 pages).  January
1994.
7he Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the  findings  of work  in progress  to encourae  the exchange  of ideas  aboNt
development  issues.  An  objective  of the  series  is  to  get  the  findings  out  quickly,  evn ifthe presentations  are  less  than  fully polished  The
papers  carry  the  names  of the  authors  and  should  be  used  and  cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusons  are  the
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By
Takamass Akiyama and Donald F. LarsonSummary
Sub-Saharan  Africa remains  dependent  on a few primary commodities  for a large shre  of its
export  eamings-coffee,  cocoa,  cotton, sugar,  tea and  tobacco. Several  countries  are aLnost  exclusively
dependent  on one  or two  of these  commodities.  Because  these  commodities  face  a relatively  price-inelastic
demand,  production  decisions  by individual  countries  can affect  world  prices  even  when  their  market  share
is relatively  low. This characteristic  complicates  investment  decisions  for producers  and policy decisions
for govenmnunts  as follows. First, production expansion  that would  be profitable  for  price-taking  fims
may result in lower prices, lower revenues,  and lower profitability. This  phenomenon  is known  as the
'adding-up"  problem  and was first introduced  to the eco omics  literature  by Harry Johnson  and Jalhdish
Bhagwati  in the 1950s. Second,  docisions  to tax producers  will also affect international  pries,  with a
portion  of the  tax burden  bome  by international  consumers. Deciding  the correct level to tax producers  is
the "optimal  tax' problem. Third,  the extent  of real exchange  rate changes  on the balance-of-trade  may  be
small since changes in export revenue  may offset export volume changes for commodities  facing an
"adding-up'  problem.  Finally, regionally  optimal  production levels and tax levels are different from
country-specific  levels. Imposing  a tax which is optimal  for the region across all countries  within the
region  will not maxinize the welfare  of the countries  in the region  unless traufrs  are made among  the
countries.  This paper  systenatically  examines  the markets  for the major agricultural  commodities  that are
of primary  importance  to Sub-Saharan  Afr.ca (SSA) for evidence  of an "adding-up"  problem. Few SSA
countries  individually  face an 'adding-up' problemn.  However,  in the cases of cocoa  in Cote  d'lvoire  and, to
a lesser  extent  cocoa in Ghana,  tea in Kenya,  and burley  tobacco  in Malawi,  new investments  are likely  to
affect  intemational  prices.
Where  an "adding-up"  problem  does exist, export  taxes rather than export quotu should be used
Such  taxes must be constantly  evaluated  as the unterlying d-termina:nts-exchange  rates, production  coss,
prices,  and market  shares- change. Further,  sLice  agricutlure  is frequently  heavily  taxed, implicit  taxes -
such as  over-valued  exchange  rates- should  be c.nsidered as well.  The extent to which an "adding-up"
problem does exists depends on marginal revenue effects relative to  marginal cosu.  As a  result,
igovernment  programs  which  encouraging  production  tbrougii  area expanion will have  a different  effect  cn
welfare  than programs encouraging  more efficient  methods  of production  such as the development  of
improved  varieties.
At a practical level, the analysis suggests  that often the export tax level does not need to be
calculated  preciscly,  since  the primary  effect  of setting  the export  tax anywhere  in the neighborhood  of the
optimal  tax is to transfer revenues  from producers  to the government,  rather than to affect total welfare.
As a result, the primary effect of setting export taxes at a less-than-optimal  level is to provide  more
resources  to farmers  and the agricultural  sector  at the expense  of government  revenue. This  characteristic
is especially  important  when  the  crop is grown  by low-income  smaliholders.
The coordination  of  tax policies and production  levels regionally  in Sub-Sahran Africa faces
sevre problems,  both in terms of implementation  and equity. Policies  that would reduce output levels
regionally would benefit larger, often wealthier,  African  countries  at the expense  of smaller  countries.
Also, in rany  instances,  regions  outside  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  especially  Latin America  and Asia, would
receive  the primary  bcnefits  from  such an arrangement.
ii1. Introduiction
Sharp  decUi  es in world  agricultural  commodity  prices  and in  teal revenues  (income  terms  of trade)
generated  by the important  export  commodities  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  have  led  to concern  over
the export  prospects  for the region. A rcal price  index  for SSA's  major  agricultural  export  commodities
shows a decline  of 4.2%  per annum  (p.a.) since  the late 1970s.  SSA's income  tern of trade for
agricultural  commodities  declined  at 4.2%, while,  during  the  same  period,  the agricultural  income  tenn of
trade  for Asia  increased  at 1.7%  (Table  1).
Table 1: Growth  rates  of income  terms  of trade  for  selec:ed  regions,  1975-90.
Nine tnajor  Total
Relodo  SSA  commodliles  Anrculur
-%p.a.  - -%p.a-
:ia  -1.7  1.7
Latin  America  -3.9  *1.S
Sub-Sah  rAica  4.2  4.2
Source:  FAO  and  IECIT,  WVorld  Bank
A feature of SSA's agricultural  commodity  exports is that a few commodities  account for a large
share of total agricultural  comunodity  exports  - .he  top five export crops account for about two-thirds  of
total agricultural  comnmodity  exports - and this share has been increasing  over time. The decline  in Sub-
Sahamn Africa's agricultural  income  terms of trade and the increasing  concentration  of SSA's agri,:ultural
commodity  exports has raised anew  the issue  of the 'adding up" or fallacy  of composition  problem.
The 'adding  up"  problem has been discussed widely, especially in the  context of  primnary
commodity  expc  strategies  for SSA countries. Since many  SSA exports face price-inelastic  demand,  an
increase  in export quantities can potentially  reduce overall export revenues from these commodities  and
lower the general economic  welfare of the country.  However, there seems to be confusion as tc the
p,actical implications  of an adding-up  problem  for commodity  production  and export policies. Because  the
formulation  of strategies  is of great importance  for Sub-Saharan  Africa,  clarifization  of the issues in teru
of theoretical  and empirical  analysis is needed. Hence,  the main focus of the paper is to identify  the nature
and extent  of the adding-up  problem  in Sub-Saharan  Africa and to sugge.c appropriate  commnodity  policies
for  the region.Following  this introduction,  Section  2 reviews  the characteristics  of SSA's  agriculuWal  commodity
exports. Section 3 defines  the adding-up  problem  and  provides  an empirical  measure  of the  problem  for
pnmzwy  commodity  exports  in Sub-Sahaaz  Africa. Section  4 exaniis  how  the adding-up  problem  can
complicate  a number  of standard  policy-related  problems.  Section  5 concludes.
22. Agriculture  Export  Eamings  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
Sub-Saharan  Africa  is dependent  on a few  prinary commodities  for export  eaming.  For nmny
countries,  this dependence  has not changed  significantly  over three decades. Since the 1960s  when
agriculture  avraged over 20% of world trade, the inportance  of agriculual  trade world-wide  has
dinmnished  such  that,  for the 1988  to 1990  period,  agricultuic  accounted  for less  than 10%  of world  trade.
Yet agricultural  pr  ~.a.ts  comprise  more than 25% of export earninp  in  29  African  countries.
Agricultural  expoxti  account  for 50-75%  of export  camings  in eight  countries,  and  for more  than 75%  in
eight countries (see Table 2).  Further, many  of those countries  no longer  dependent  on ariculture ua
instead  dependent  on  a non-agricultural  primar,  commodity.  For  example,  Angola  and  Nigeria  rely almost
exclusively  on petroleum  exports; Zaire and Zambia carn  most of their export carings through  copper
exports; ani Botswana  relies heavily  on the export of diamonds.
Table 2: SSA countries  dependency  on  aBriculture  fcr export earnings
Agriculture's s iare of export earmings (1988-90  averge)
Less thte 25%  LI0%  50-75%  a00%
Angola  B:nin  Cote dlvoire  Burundi
Bouwana  Cental Afnan  Republic  Cameroon  Ethiopia
Congo  Cape  Terde  Gumea.Bissau  Mali
Gabon  Gluna  Kenya  Malawi
Guinea  Gambia  Madagcar  Rwanda
Equatorial  Guinea  Burkina  Faso  Sao  Tome &  Prinpe  Sudan
Mauritania  Liberia  Chad  Somlia










One or more of a set of nine  agricultural  crops-banaars,  cocoa, coffee,  cotton,  groundauts,
rubber,  sugar,  tea, and tobacco-are  of primary  importance  in at least  one country  in Africa  and together
these  commodities  account  for about  70-76%  of agricultural  exports  for the region. This statenent  has
been  true  for three  decades  as can  be seen  in Table  3. Table  4 provides  the  share  of total expot earminp
3derived  from  these  nine  z& 6ncultural  crops for each SSA  country.  The nost srildng depedencies  are in
Bunmdi,  Ethiopia,  Malawi,  Rwanda,  and Uganda.  Table  S shows  each  country's  reliUnce  on exports  fom
each  of the nine commodities  The exclusive  dependence  of Burundi  and Uganda  on rv 'e  hat be  a
constant  feature  of tho,e  -onomies  across  decades. In some  cases,  notably  tobacco  in Malawi,  or tea in
Kenya,  the  dependence  bh been  incrmasing  rather  than  diminishing.
Table  3: Share  of Sub-Saharan  Africa's  agricultural  export  earnings  by crop, 1961-90
au J6V2  127021979  198021989  19.i920
Bannas  0.3  0.7  05  0.7
Cocoa  1.1  20.6  21.9  19.5
Coffee  19.2  25.9  26.7  20.5
Cottou  10.0  9.1  8.5  12.0
Orounwjuts  10.9  5 s  2.1  2.S
Rubba  ;6  1.7  2.1  3.0
Sugp  4.0  4.7  5.1  7.0
Tea  2.1  2.6  3.7  4.2
Tobao  3.9  3.2  4.1  '.4
Nin  major  crop  70.0  74.1  76.0  75.9
Source:  FAO
While many SSA countries  remain highly dependent  on the export of a  few agricultura
commodities,  the  world  has become  less  dependent  on exports  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (Table  6). While
banana  exports  may  be vitally  important  to Somalia,  banana  exsports  from all of SSA now  constitute  less
than 3% of world  trade in banwias  whereas  in the 1960s  their share  was 9%. Groundnut  exports  are
important  in that thinly traded market; however, groundnut exports are trivial in the larger market for
oilseeds  and oilseed  products. Cocoa  is the only major  agricu!tural  conunodity  for which  Sub-Saharan
Africa  produces  more  than one-half  of world  production.
4Table  4:  Share  of total  export  earnings  from  nine  major  crops,  by countr, 1961-90
Country  .961-69  1970-79  1980-89  1963-90
Angola  48.5  27.0  3.9  0.5
Buunudi  74.9  90.9  90.3  31.9
Bcnin  2?.9  51.3  31.6  33.4
Botswana  1.8  0.2  0.0  0.0
CentAficau  RepubUo  47.0  45.4  ;7.1  25.1
Cote dvoirm  62.5  57.7  56.5  S3.2
Cameoon  70.0  61.6  49.8  4S.3
Congo  14.3  1.3  1 0  0.9
Cape  Vrde  25.9  11.5  18.4  28.4
Ethiopia  60.7  56.3  h6.1  61.7
Gabon  1.9  0.6  0.4  0.3
Ghan  70.4  69.3  49.4  44 9
Guinea  21.4  7.9  2.9  2.3
Gumbi;  92.9  89.1  45.3  39.6
Guinea-Bissau  59.8  56.9  20.5  6.2
Equatorial Guinea  17.0  44.2  21.4
Burkina  Faso  13.8  37.5  43.3  35.0
Kenya  29.7  40.3  45.9  46.3
Liberia  22.3  17.6  25.2  26.3
Madagasca  44.5  40.2  42.3  27.2
Mali  21.9  39.4  35.2  47.3
Mozambique  40.1  34.1  21.1  11.2
Mauritius  92.7  79.4  45.8  32.2
Malawi  81.4  82.8  34.8  88.6
Niger  67.5  12.9  0.3  0.6
Nigeria  46.9  6.3  2.5  2.9
RPWaa  a  S4.3  74.9  31.6  80.7
Sudan  63.5  67.0  46.0  49.4
Senegal  75.4  45.2  18.3  19.5
SieraLeone  5.8  16.7  25.0  15.4
Somalia  39.9  16.5  12.7  28.1
Sao Tome  & Principe  73.4  75.8  70.4  50.3
Swaziland  29.2  34.9  36.4  29.1
Seychelles  0.1  0.0
Chad  67.1  39.1  35.4  48.3
Togo  53.0  37.3  31.6  30.7
Tanzanis  33.5  44.1  52.2  49.2
Uganda  72.3  89.2  95.9  94.1
Zaire  11.3  13.5  17.0  11.4
Zambia  1.2  0.8  1.1  1.0
Zimbabwe  26.4  25.2  32.1  32.1
Sub-Sahara  Africa(non-oil)  38.0  37.2  29.8  26.4
Sub-S  aAfrica  39.S  25.4  18.8  18.3
World  5.9  3.4  2.1  1.5
Source:  FAO and ECIT, World  Bank
STabIt  5: Share  of export dmrnings  from  impcnan.  export crops  in sel!-ted  SSA  countries,  1961-90
1961-69  1970-79  12s0Qs9  2890
Deftsas
C"pV'uerde  17.6  11.3  18.2  27.9
Somalia  39.6  16.5  12.7  28.1
Cocoa
Cotedlvowre  21.3  24.9  33.0  31.4
Camerao  30.3  27.4  19.5  17.8
Gh.iza  69.3  69.3  49.3  44.6
Equatob  GOine  70.4  40.5  19.2
SoaTomeA&Principe  70.6  75.0  70.1  50.2
Coftee
l3urundi  66.8  34.6  84.6  tO's
Central AfricnRepubLc  19.8  '6.9  13.3  17.0
Cote dlvoiu  36.4  i9.2  17.8  13.0
Cameroon  25.2  27.2  23.9  20.0
Ethiopia  57.8  52.9  63.8  60.1
Kenya  17.t  26.2  25.6  21.6
Maguar  30.1  34.2  37.0  20.9
Rwanda  5;.S  66.5  71.2  65.1
'. &rvArj a  13.7  23.1  31.0  22.8
Uganda  43.6  72.4  93.3  90.6
Cotton
1iedn  1.8  24.8  20.8  31.6
Burkina  Faw  9.9  29.1  42.6  34.7
Nhli  7.2  28.6  32.8  45.4
Sudan  53.3  53.3  38.0  43.2
Chad  66.8  39.0  35.3  47.7
Togo  3.9  1.6  10.4  16.9
T  ai  15.2  13.2  12.1  15.9
Groundnuts
Ganbia  92.9  89.1  44.4  36.9
S-negal  75.3  42.9  16.0  17.7
Rubber
Liberia  19.8  13,6  19.1  24.5
Sugar
Mauritius  90.7  77.3  44.3  36.9
SAvzzland  27.8  32.9  34.9  28.8
Tea
Kenya  10.8  13.3  19.4  24.6
Malawi  27.0  19.0  16.7  11.7
Rwanda  2.5  8.5  10.4  15,6
Tobacco
Malawi  37.3  47.3  51.6  64.4
Zimbabwe  22.3  13.9  18.8  20.2
Source:  FAO
6Table 6: Share  of SSA  exports  in world  trade,  by selected  commodities  and aggreLates,  1961-90
Country  1961.69  1970-79  198049  13s.s90
Banan  9  0  5.9  2.9  2.3
Cocoa  67.4  59.6  47.4  44.5
Coffe  24.5  27.1  21.9  19.2
Cotton  12.1  12.8  10.9  12.9
Grundnutb  61.1  39.0  13.4  20.4
Rubb,t  6.9  5.6  5.1  6.1
BSUU  5.7  4.5  4.5  5 2
Tea  3.7  14.9  15.3  14.9
Tobaco  9.4  8.5  10.1  12.5
Nine Mjor crops  17.9  17.7  14.8  13.9
Total  apicUltute  7.1  5.7  3.7  2.9
Total  dadc  2.7  2,4  1.6  1.2
Source: FPAO
Tle dependency  on  a few  agicultural  commodities  for export  earaings  often  reflects  a dependency
on agriculture  in the country's  ecrnomy.  Table  7 prov'des  the  agriculture's  share  of GDP  in countries  with
available  data. In many  countries  agriculture  generates  such  a large  portion  of the  country's  awnual  income
that polic.es  and  programs  targeting  commodity  and agricultural  sub-sectors  become  vitalIy  important  fir
the  economy  as a whole.
Table  7: Agriculture's  share  of GDP  for  selected  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
Country  1970  1980  199s
per  cent  -
BCrin  37  34  33
Botuwan  25  14  6
Cameroon  37  28  27
Congo  21  15  13
ComOro=  . 4 1
Cape Verde  14  13
Gabon  9  9
Ghana  54  56  47
Gunea  . 26
Guinea-!3issau  66  39  46
Mali  55  50  47
Rwanda  42  47  37
Senegal  28  22  21
Seychelles  . 6  4
Chad  46  54  38
Togo  30  s6  36
Zambia  10  10  11
Source:  Ini.ational  Econornics  Deprtmnent,  World Bank.
7Price volatility is a chaacteristic of commodity  prices and dependence  on commodity  exports
generally  translates into volatile export revenues. Figure I  illustrates  the effects of commodity  price
movements  in trade data from SSA. The top line in the graph is the income  terms of trade (the value  of
exports  deflated  by a price index  of manufactured  exports  from G-5 countries-the  Bank's  MUV)  for total
trade.  The high level and volatility  of the index  throughout  much of the 1970s  was notably  due to the
development  of oil production  in Nigeria  combined  with the two oil shocks  of that decade. Excluding
Nigeria  from the aggregate  data (the  second  line fr .r the top), the effect of the 'conunodity  boom' of the
1970s  is less pronounced. The third line from the top is an index  based on the export value of the nine
major agrcultural export crops in S  SA, while  the bottom line is an index for all agricultural  exports.
These indices  are characterized  by a sharp peak in 1977  and then a precipitous  drop that was somewhat
reversed  in the mid-1980s  and a continued  decline  thereafter. While  the decline  fromn  1977  to 1980 was
sharp,  it occurred  from  historically  high  price levels. The most recent  decline  from 1986  to the present  is a
decline  from  what might  be considered,  in a historic  sense,  average  income  terms  of trade levels.
Income terms  of  trade





61  63  65  67  69  71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89
62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90
=  Major crop  index  - Total agricu1lure  -c-  TOIal  trade  O  B  Trade  (exc Nigerio)
Figure 1: Income  terms  of trade for total tradc  (including  and excluding  Nigeria),  agriculture,  and major
SSA commodities.
8Figure  2 compares  indices  of income  terms of trade based  on the nine  major  SSA commodities  for
the Latin American,  Asian, and SSA regions.  For the group of commodities  important  to Africa, the
experience  of SSA has not been  radically  different  from  the experience  of Asia or Latin America-although
large  differences  did occur  in  pecific  crops  and in specific  countries. While  the income  terns of trade for
Asia have been more stable than for Latin America  and Africa, all three regions have experienced  a
substantial  deterioration  in the terms  of trade for this group of crops since  the mid 1970s. For agriculture
as a whole,  however,  a diffcrent  story emerges  (see Figure 3).  In SSA the nine  commodities  represent  a
large proportion  of total agricultural  exports so that an income  terms of trade index  for total agriculture
follows  fairly closely  the path of the nrne-commodity  index,  falling  sharply  after 1977. In Asia and Latin
America,  the export  performance  of other  crops resulted  in improving  income  terms of trade in the case of
Asia, and a less  dramatic  decline  in the case  of Latin America.
Regional  income  terms  of  trade
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Figure 2: Regional  income  terms  of trade  for the nine  commodities  that are of major  importance  to
Sub-Saharan  Africa.
9Regional  income  terms  of  trade





160  ...  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61  63  65  67  69  71  735 75  77  79  81  a83  85  87  89
62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  90
Suffb-Sohnra  Africa  - Lotin  Arnerice  Asia 
Figure 3:: Regional  income  torms  of trade for agriculture.
In both Asia and Latin Arnerica,  non-traditional  crops expanded  while the composition  of ex)ports
from SSA rmaninedi  fairly sta8nat  (Figure 4).  In Latin America  (see Figure  S) the dominiance  of co fee in
export ewnings gave way to expanding exports of  ftuits, vegetables, and oilseed products-primsarily
soybewu and  soybean meal.  In Asia (see Figure 6),  productivity increases affected all  sectors of
rioculture  with  the largest gains co.rting  from fruits and vegetables  and the dramatic increase  in palm oil
exports from Mialaysia  and Indonesia.
U'hile we have focused  on the more relevant measure,  the income  terms of trade which  includes  the
effwc of production  gains there mav be some interest in purely price terms of trade.  Figure 7 plots the
barter  terms  of trade  (a nominal  price  index  deflated  by the Of  UV for the nine  rnajor  export  crops. Two
sets of commodity  prices were used to derive  indices.  I  Tne index  given in the top line in the graph is based
on observed spot narket prices taken as indicative of world prices.  I\oC  second is an average of SSA
export unit values based on FAO export quantity and value dtat.  Ite  advantage  of the fonner is that the
prices can be more readily  observed  without  effor. Yet very little  trade mnay  be associated  with such priceus
I There nrc also choices  in thec  mechanics  of constructing a price index.  A Fishcr index, which is thie  geometric avergte Of
Laspeym  and Pauchc. indices,  is repottd  hcre.  However, the battcr terms of tmde tdW  not prove *cnsitive to indexation
and either  a Laspeym  or Psachec  index would provide SiMilW  M3sult
10Composition  of  agricultural exports
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Figure C: Composition  of agricultural  exports  from  Asia for 1970  and 1990
and unit valu,es  could more accurately reflect actual earnings. There  are some important  differences
between  the two sets of indices. Conspicuous  by their absence  are price spikes  in 1963, 1974, and 1980
for the barter terms of trade based on export  unit values. Decomposition  of the index  revealed  that these
were  the result  of sharp peaks in the world  price for sugar that failed  to show  up in SSA export  earnings.
Nonetheless,  in both series,  real commodity  prices  declined  during  the  past decade.
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Figure  7: Barter  terms of trade for major  Sub-Saharan  African  commodity  exports, valued at international
market  prices mnd  at averag export price
133. The Adding-up  Problem  in Sub-Saharan Africa
lTe adding-up  problem  occurs because individuals  can produce  small amounts  of a commodity
without  affecting  world  prices, although  their additional  collective  supplies  can drive down  wo:ld prices.
Individual  producers  will  continue  to produce  to the  point  where  marginal  cost equals  the world  price,  while
the profit mximizing point, from the perspective  of country-wide  welfare,  is where  marginal  cost equals
marginal  revenue. Stated  another  way,  the adding-up  problem  arises when a country  fails to fully  exercise
any maket power  its producers  collectively  possess.
The problem  was first discussed  in the context  of imnuserizing  growth  by Jagdish  Bhagwati  (1958)
and Harry Johnson  (1955). Bhagwati  proved  that economic  growth  could be inmmiserizing  in the presence
of the adding-up  problem. More recently,  the paradox of immiserizing  growth was proven to be more
general  and arises from a sub-optimal  allocation  of resources. (See for example,  Bhagwati,  Brecher  and
Hata, 1984; and Hata, 1984.) Still, issues relating  to the adding-up  problem,  especially  in the context  of
primary commodities,  remain hotly debated because the:  optimal  policies prescriptions  rest on hard-to-
measure  empirical  parameters.
The adding-up  problem  can be described  mathematically  by starting  with the producer  problem  of
maximizing  profits over  time:
max  EJ  [ps'  - C(sA)Jehdt  s.t. d'  = s  + s'  1)
p
that is, the producer  maximizes  the expected discounted  stream  of profits, where  p is price, sb are home-
country  sales, c is the cost of production,  and r is the discount  rate. The problem  is constrained  by the fact
that  the home-country  sales  and sales from  tl. rest of the  world  (s')  must equal  world  demand  (dw).
The solution  to the  problem is given  by 2:
-J,  = Max,E[p(dw  - S5)  - C(dw  - st)]  2)
2Brock  and  Malliaris,  1989,  pp.352-55,  provide  a good  summary  of dynamic  optimization  issues.
14The first-order  condition  is given  by:
d  ' -s`+p(d;  -s  `t)-  C'(d;w-  s,")  =O.  3)
p
Noting  that .hd  s'  , and rearranging  (3) provides:
=P_  ~~~~~~~~~~4) d; - sfJw
Dividing  both sides by p  and by dividing  the numerator and denominator  of the LHS by dw
provides  the optimal  tax condition:
m  n' - E)  p
where s  < 0 is the elasticity  of derand,  c  > 0  is the supply elasticity for the rest of the workld
m'  =  d/d  is the  market shure  o' :'  home  country  and where mw  - md is  - themuet  sareo  f the
rest of the  world. T  defines  the optimal  tax rate.
Expressed  in terms of (5), the adding-up  problem  occurs when the individual  marginal  producer
produces  to the point where price equais marginal  cost.  Generally  this is sub-optimal  and a non-zero
export  tax will increase  over-all  retums  to the country. However,  as a practical matter,  the optimal  tax is
often zero because of small market share or because  other producers  can easily expand production. In
terms  of the optimal-tax  condition,  the optimal  export tax approaches  zero when  the narket share of the
home country  (mA)  shrinks,  when the supply responsiveness  of competitors  (s  ) increases,  and when
demand  becomes  more elastic  (when  - s,  increases).
To see how the various parameters  of the model affect the choice of the optimal  tax, a simple
model  was constructed  of the type  used  to calculate  optimal  tax rates reported  later in the paper. Constant-
elasticity  supply  curves  for the home  country  and the rest-of-the-world  were specified  along  with a world-
wide  constant-elasticity  demand  curve. A world  price and home-country  price were solved  via the adding-
up constraint  that total supply  and demand  must match. As a result,  market share, which  is a function  of
home-country  and res-of-the-world  supplies,  is endogenous  as well. As  a staring point,  the home  country
15was assumed  to have  about  a 25% share  of the world  mnarket;  the world  demnand  price elasticity  was set at -
0.4; and the home  country  and the rest-of-the-world  both supply  elasticities  were  set at 0.9.
Figure 8 show  the effects  of changing  the assumed  demnand  elasticity  on the optimal  tax rate  (left-
hand axis) and the equilibriumn  market  share (right-hand  axis). As the demand  elasticity  rises, the optimal
tax rate declines. However,  since  the decline  in the tax rate rises home-country  prices and home-country
supplies,  the equilibrium  market share for the home-country  rises as well, partially  off-setting  the first-
order  effect on the tax rate.
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Figure 8: Effects  of demand  elasticity  on the optimal  tax rate and mnarket  share.
Figure 9 maps out the effects of changing  the supply elasticity of the rest-of-the-world,  while
holding  the home-country  elasticity  constant  at 0.9.  The net-effects  are similar  to increasing  the demnand
elasticity. The first and primary effect is to push down  the optimal tax rate which increases  domestic
prices  and increases  the home  country's  market  share.
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Figure 9: Effect of the rest-of-the-world  supply elasticity  on the optimal  tax rate and market  share.
Finally,  Figure 10 maps the effect of changing  the home country's  supply elasticity  while holding
the supply  elasticity  constant  at 0.9 for the rest-of-the-world.  Unlike  the other parameters,  the optimal  tax
rate is not very sensitive  to alternative  home-country  supply elasticities. Instead,  the primary effect is on
market  sha-  which  declines  as home-country  supplies  become  increasingly  inelastic.
The adding-up  problem  can be stated in terrns of the elasticity  of export revenue  with respect to
volume  (ERV). This is a convenient  concept, since it relates to the market power of the hor.nc  country.
Since  the revenue  generated  by exports  (sales)  is R(sh  ) = psI  = p(d  - .s),  ERV = 1  + +  so that:
a, p
ERV = 1+-=_-  =I-/ e  6)
J7  p
where the entity 17 = (e;-  mmw")  / m'  is the price elasticity of demand facing a country (see., fot
example,  Imnan  and Duncan).  Therefore  the ERV is bound somewhere  between  1 (when  the market  share
of th: home  country  is nearly  zero, and 0 (since  the marginal  cost of production  cannot be negative).
Although  the adding-up problem usually centers on commodities  (Martin, 1993 is one of the
exceptions),  there is no reason  from theory  that  the adding-up  problem  be a comnmodity  problem.  Still, the
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Figure 10: The effect  of changing  the home-county  supply  elasticity  on the optimal  tax rate and market
share.
raw  material  cosu in the final-corLsunrption  form  for  niany  commodities  is quite  low. For  example,  the  tax
on a cigaret in most  countries  greatly  exceeds  the cost  of the  raw  tobacco  contained  in the cigarett. As a
result,  a ve-y  large  decline  in the  price  of a commodity  like  tobacco  nay result  in a very  small  decline  in the
price  of the form  in which  the  good  is finally  consumed  such  as cigarettes  or cigars. Since  very  large  price
char.  es result m very small changes  in consumption,  these goods  tend to have low demand  price
elasticities.  Additionally,  several  countries  and regions  have  concentrated  market  shares. These  features
suggest  that adding-up  problems  are likely  to occur  in commodity  markets. Further,  since  several  raw
commodities  ar  especially  important  in several  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  opdmal  pricing  becomes
an urgent  policy  and development  issue.
In much  of the literature  on the adding  up problem,  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is treated  as a single
region.  As will  be discussed  in the next  section,  that approach  leads  directly  to fumdamental  difficulties  in
terms  of policy  inplementation.  Still,  that approach  has been  taken  in initially  calculating  estimates  of the
regional  adding-up  problem  for SSA,  as reported  in Table  8.  The  table  shows  esfimatea  of the short-  (2 to
183 years)  and long-term  (7 to 10 years)  ERVs  based  on SSARs  market  share in world  production,  for
agricultural  commodities  in which  SSA  holds  a sizable  share  of the world  market  (soe  Annex  Tables  1-6
for greater  detail). Since  adjustments  such  as production  expansion  for perennial  crops  takes  time,  long.
run  strategies  should  be  based  on long-run  ERVs. Basing  the analysis  on SSA  as a single  entity  generates
lower  ERVs  (and  higher  optimal  tax rates)  than does  an analysis  based  on single  country  sares.  Still,
ignoring  for  the moment  implementation  issues,  the adding-up  problem  for Sub-Saharan  Africa  appurs
limited  to cocoa,  coffee,  tea, and  tobacco
Cocoa  faces  the nost  serious  adding-up  problem.  In the short  run,  the  ERV  for  cocoa  is negative,
implying  that SSA  export  revenues  will fall with  an increase  in exports. Even  in the long  run, it is not
profitable  for SSA  to produce  cocoa  unless  the  production  cost  of  the additioral  output  is less  than  33%  of
the  world  price. Coffee,  tea,  and  burley  tobacco  may  face  an adding-up  problem  in the short-run,  but it is
not  nearly  as serious  as for cocoa. It is profitable  to increase  production  for  these  commodities  so long  us
the  production  cost  of  the  additional  output  is less  than  about  80%  of  the  world  price.
19Table  8: ExpOrt  revenue  elasticities  and optimal  export  tax for selected  commodities  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
demand  elasticity  supp;y alasticity  IRV  estimate  optimal
CommoditV  share  short  long  short  lOna  Dhort  loaf  tme  (/)
Cocoa
SSA  54.5  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.90  -0.19  0.33  67.3
Coae  dlvorc  29.8  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.90  0.45  0.71  23.9
Ghana  11.2  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.90  0.82  0.91  9.3
Nigeria  6.5  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.90  0.90  0.95  5.2
Cwncr.o)n  5.1  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.90  0.92  0.96  4.0
Coffee
SSA  20.7  .0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.80  0.64  0.80  20.0
CoW  dlvore  4.3  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.80  0.93  0.96  3.7
Ethiopia  3.3  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.80  0.95  0.97  2.8
Uganda  3.0  -0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.80  0.95  0.97  2.6
Zaire  1.7  .0.30  -0.40  0.35  0.80  0.97  0.99  1.4
Tea
SSA  16.3  -0.30  -0.40  0.25  0.70  0.68  0.83  16.6
Kenya  10.3  .0.30  -0.40  0.25  0.70  0.80  0.90  10,0
M1Aawi  2.1  .0.30  -0.40  0.25  0.70  0.96  0.98  2.0
Burley  Tobacco
SSA  10.6  -0.10  -0.50  0.50  0.80  0.79  0.87  12.6 !  lawi  9.0  -0.10  -0.50  0.50  0.80  0.84  0.93  7.3
Cotton
SSA  5.4  .0.15  -0.30  0.30  0.90  0.88  0.95  4.7
Sudan  0.7  -1.15  -0.30  0.30  0.90  0.98  0.99  0.6
Cote dlvoire  0.7  .0.15  -0.30  0.30  0.90  0.99  0.99  0.6
Sugar
SSA  3.7  -0.20  -0.30  0.45  0.80  0.94  0.97  0.5
MaUriti'is  0.7  -0.20  -0.30  0.45  0.80  0.99  0.99  0.4
204. The Effect of the Adding-Up  Problem  on Trade Policy
Policies  suggested  for regions  facing  an adding-up  problem  include  diversification  (Godfrey,  1983;
Stewart,  1991),  taxaion (Stewart),  and production  quotas  (Stewart). Usually,  these  policies  imply  reduc&
incentives  for tradiuonal  export crops in SSA. However,  an important  consideration  often ignored  in the
analysis  is whether,  in fact, SSA should  be treated  as a single  econormic  unit. It is clear that Cote d'lvoire
faces a serious adding-up  problem  with regard  to cocoa because  of its large world :.aarket  share (30%).
But shoulu  countries  such as Togo or Benin  which individually  do not face an adding-up  problem  adopt
j,  licies aimeo at discouraging  cocoa production? Further, it is not clear that it is necessary  or even
beneficial  to encourage  diversification  by penalizing  traditional  exports.
hi the past, policies  explicitly  or implicitly  discouraging  the production  of prinary commodities
have ofter.  led to adverse  and lasting  consequences  in SSA. Exarnples  include  Ghanas  cocoa policy and
Nigeria's  pclicies affecting  palm oil in the 1970s. Policies  or events which constrain  tditional  exports
often  spur investmez in other countries. Should  diversification  prove unsuccessful,  it leaves SSA with
considerably  less total exyert revenue  than before. For cxample,  in response  to the decline  in Ghana's
cocoa  production  in thc .'v7  Os,  Brazil, Cote  d'lvoire,  and Malaysia  expanded  their production  substantially.
Five issues  pertinent  to countries  in which  exports  are concentrated  or face an adding-up  problen
are discussed  in detail  below-export  taxes, coordination  of policies  among  SSA countries,  diversification,
the effect  of extension  services  and production  increases  on welfare,  and exchange  rates policies.
Export  Tiaes
As discussed  earlier, export taxes can maximize  welfare from exports of a  commnodity  for a
country  which  has some  measure  of monopoly  power. The optimal  level  of the export  tax is that which, at
a country  level, equates  marginal most  with marginal  revenue  when  the commodity  is produced  by a largc
number  of smallholder  farmers  who otherwise  perceive  the world price as their marginal revenue. The
optimal  tax level  in a sttic  frimework  is the inverse  of the price elasticity  of demand  facing the country.
21Calculation  of the optimal  tax level dynamically  becomes  considerably  more complicated  especially  in the
case  of perennials  which  require  more  than one year  of investnent  for production.
Still a prominent  characteristic  of the relationship  between  the export  tax and welfare  fron the
commodity  (as measured  by the sum of producer  surplus  and government  tax revenues)  is that the country's
welfare  remains  little  changed  over a wide range  of export  tax rates around the optimal  rate.  An example
of the change in welfare  under different  export tax rates is shown in Figure I1.  This is the case of a
country  with a world  market share of 12%. The optimal  level  of the export  tax is 15%. Assumptions  are
that the world  price elasticity  of demand  is  -0.35  and the supply  elasticity  of all producers  is 0.5 The total
welfare  hardly changes  for tax rates of 0 to 40%.  Simulations  with different  market shares produced
similar  results. However,  the distribution  of income  between  the producers  and the government  changes
drastically  with changes  in the export  tax. Figure 11 also shows,  as theory  predicts,  that export  revenue  is
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Figure  II: Changes  in Welfare  and Export  Revenue  with  Export  Tax
22For perennial  crops,  because  production  is dependent  on investments  (new  plantings), lower  taxes
result  in higher  long-term  production  potential. Hence,  the level  of the optimal  tax is critically  dependent
on the viscount  rate used. For example,  if a zero export  tax was implemented  for five years in the above
example  of a country  that has a 12%  world  market  share, the country's  welfare  would  be slightly  less than
the naximum  in the short  run but its welfare  would  be large  in ten  years.
The discussion  above  suggests  that the level  of the export  tax can be set within  a fairly  wide range
without  significantly  affecting  total welfare. This is an important  point  in practice,  since  high export  taxes
may not be practical.  High export taxes encourage  high rates of evasion  either through smuggling  or
bribes. In addition,  the  tax may prove  regressive  if it places  a high burden  on low-income  smallholders.  If
a country  decides  to impose  an export  tax, it is critical  that the level be exanined frequently. The optimal
tax level  changes  with changes  in the market  share  and in price  elasticities  of demand  and supply.
Another  consideration  in examining  export  taxes is the degree  to which  the commodity  is directly
or indirectly  subsidized  or taxed along  the production  chain.  Because  of their traditional  place in nany
economies,  policies  regarding  trade  and production  have  frequently  generated  layers  of institutions  working
at cross purposes. On the one hand, traditional  export crops often receive  preferential  treatment in the
allocation  of extension  services  and transportation  services  which  amounts  to an indirect  subsidy. More
directly,  producers  are sometimes  offered  guaranteed  prices  above  world market rates backed  with public
funds. At the same time, cesses are often levied  directly  or indirectly  to finance over-staffed  marketing
boards.  In the case of cocoa, Stryker et. al. (1990) found that the Ghanaian cocoa marketing  board
operations  implicitly  taxed  cocoa  at a rate of 20-50%  from 1955  to 1985  - a rate much  higher  than the 9-
10%  optimal  tax calculated  in Table 8. Additionally,  over-valued  exchange  rates also serve as an indirect
tax on exports and an indirect  subsidy  on input imports. Such an over-valuation  can arise from direct
exchange-rate  controls,  but can also arise  indirectly  - for example  from import  restrictions  (See  Krueger,
Schiff  and  Valdez, 1991). Export  taxes should  not be placed  as an additional  layer on a complex  structure
of subsidization  and taxation,  but rather  in place of often  conflicting  policy  instruments.
23Coordination  of policies  amnong  SSA countries
Because  export  revenues  can be increased,  at least in the short-rn, by reducing  world exports  of
commodities  that have price elasticities  of less than unity, there have been a number of attempts to
construct  international  commodity  agreements  to raise  commodity  prices. There  are at present  international
agreemnents  for natural rubber, coffee and cocoa but the economic  provisions  of the latter two are not
operative. The economic  provisions  of the International  Cocoa  Agreement  to stabilize  world  cocoa prices
were based on buffer stock operations,  but after a few years of operations  in the early 1980s,  the buffer
stock  fund was depleted  due to rapidly  increasing  world  cocoa  production.  The export  quota  system  of The
International  Coffee  Agreement  stopped  operating  in July 1989  when  members  of the Agreement  could  not
reach an agreement  on the rules of operation  for the quota system.  The International  Natural Rubber
Agreement  is based on an international  buffer stock system, but international  rubber prices have been
hovering  at the bottorn  of the support  range  for the last several  years. Recent  experience  with imremational
commodity  agreements  supports  the notion  that, as a practical  matter, it is impossible  to support world
prices above a market-clearing  level for a sustained  period  of time.  Williams  and Wright (1992) and
Larson and Colemen  (1991) both discuss  the predisposition  of commodity  management  schemes  to fail due
to price movements. An additional  problem  is the asymmetric  distribution  of benefits  arising from such
schemes.  The coordination  of tax policies  survey  SSA countries  would  face this same  obstacle.
To illustrate  the difficulty  of operating  a policy in which all SSA countries  imposed  the same
export-tax  rates, a simple  model  was built to evaluate  the effects of export  taxes imposed  at the optimal
rate by two countries,  independently  and  jointly. World  demand  elasticity  was assumed  to be  -0.35 and
a!l supply elasticities  were assumed  to be 0.5.  There are three producers  - Conntry 1 with the market
share of 10%, Country  2 with a market share of 25%, and the rest of world  (ROW). All production  is
assumed  to - -^rted.  T-'le  9 shows  changes  in key %-.Ahec  when  export  taxes  are set at the optinml
level  for each  country  independently  and when  they  are considering  Country  1 and 2 as one unit.
24Table 9: Changes  in key variables  when  two countries  move  from  taxing exports  based on country  sbauo
to a uniform  regional  tax based on combined  market  share.a/
World  market  Der centsec  ch&=g
Supply  .1.9
Price  5.7
Rest  of the world
Welfare  8.6
Export  revenue  8.6
Market  share  3.1
Country-level  effects  of moving  to a urniform  resional  tax.rmt
Country  1 (small)
Producer  surplus  -48.0
C.Lvernment  revenue  214.3
Total welfare  .1.5
Export  revenue  *15.0
Market  share  .1.
Country  2 (large)
Producer  surplus  -19.5
Government  revenue  31.8
Total  welfare  3.3
Export revcnue  .1.7
Market sharc  1.3
Reiional effects  of niovint to a uniform  regional  tax-rate
Country  I & 2 combined:
Producer  surplus  -29.5
Governnent  revenue  54.9
Total  welfare  2.0
Export  revenue  .5.5
Market share  .3.1
a/ If imposed  independently,  the optinal tax rates are 12.6%  and 34.7%  for Countries  I and 2, respectively.  If impoaed  jointly,
the optimal  regional  tax rate is  46.5% because  of the larger  market  share. See the text for  assumptions  made.
Te  simulation results show several interesting facts when the two countries impose the tax jointly,
including:
(i) The  cornbined  welfare  of the  two countries  increases  but by only  small margin. In this example,
the increase  is only  2%.
(ii) Because  of the higher  export  tax, i.e., 46.5% compared  with 12.6%  and 34.7%  when imposed
independently,  the producer  surplus  of both countries  declines  sharply;  the produc r surplus  of the
smaller  country  declines  considerably  more  than that of the larger one. The  govenrment  revenue  of
both countries  increases  sharply,  especially  that of the smaller  one.
25(iii)  Total welfare  of thi smaller  country  declines  while  that of the larger  country  increases.
(iv) Market shares and export revenues  of both countries  decline. The reduction  is considerably
greater  for the smaller  country  than for the larger  country.
(v)  Welfare,  export  revenues,  and market  share  of ROW increase  substantially.
The simulation  results  point  to an obvious  difficulty  in coordination  around  the question  of whether
the large country  will be willing  to compensate  for the loss incurred  by the small country. Because  the
combined  welfare  is increased,  the larger country  would  still gain after compensating  the loss incurred  by
the smaller  country. Possibly  a more important  problem  is that the welfare,  export revenue,  and market
share of the rest of the world increase  significantly.  In this example,  the welfare  gain by ROW is 8.6%
while  that by the two countries  combined  is only 2%.  In the long-run,  this would enable the rest of the
world  to increase  productivity  and its market  share  even  further.
D2iversification
As mentioned  above,  some  analysts  argue  that diversification  should  be a priority  in the context  of
SSA's  agricultural  export strategies  of SSA countri:s facing  adding-up  problems. However,  given  th  in
many  SSA  countries,  a large  number  of people  are engaged  in production,  processing,  and marketing  of the
najor commodities  and that these commodities  are the only cash crops, it is difficult  for any economic
development  strategy  to be viable if these commodity  subsectors  are ignored  or penalized. Diversification
usually  requires  investment  and often  the only source  of the capital  is the traditional  crop subsectors. As
discussed  below,  it is possible  to increase  the producer  surplus  and government  export  tax revenue  from the
commodity  facing  an adding-up  problem  through  productivity  increases. Such a strategy  may be a viable
option  for diversification  in many  SSA countries. Even  though  it puts additional  government  resources  into
the subsector,  just as a profitable  and dynamic  agricultural  sector often  complements  industrialization-a
profitable and dynamic traditional commodity  subsector can facilitate the development  of a  viable
diversified  agricultural  sector.
A forced  diversification  strategy  that ignores  the relative  profitability  of new  commodities  vis-a-vis
traditional conunodities  is likely to fail.  There is no guarantee  that diversification  in and of itself will
26increase  the welfare  of SSA countries. For example,  some commodities  for which  SSA does not face an
adding-up  problem  may also have very poor price prospects because of declining  demand  or sharply
increasing  supply of countries outside of the region. Additionally,  Sub-Saharan Africa may lack a
comparative  advantage  in producing  those commodities.  Diversifying  into these  commodities  might make
Sub-Saharan  Africa  worse  off when  compared  to increasing  productivity  in traditional  crops .
Alternatively,  where alternati es do exist, appropriate  export taxes on commodities  facing an
adding-up  problem  will  provide  incentives  for diversification  because  relative  prices  would  give  appropriate
incentives  to farmers  as to what crop to grow, either for domestic  consumption  or export.  Additionally,
there has been  a frequent  bias in government  spending  in many  SSA countries  in favor of traditional  export
crops in terms  of research,  extension,  marketing  and distribution  infrastructure,  which has worked  against
the establishment  and growth of other export activities. The reasons for this bias include  government
revenues  from  export  taxes  and the ease  and speed  with which  production  of traditional  export  crops can be
increased  compared  with non-traditional  ones. Removing  biases in government  services  will also encourage
the  development  of alternatives  to traditional  crops.
Tlhe  effects  of extension  services  and technical  change
Some  analysts discussing  the adding-up  problem  for SSA countries  appear to suggest  that these
countries  and the international  community  should  do nothing  for these commodities  and instead allocate
resources  to diversification.  Such advice  often  stems  from a confusion  over price  effects,  profitability  and
welfare.  Changes  in applied  technology  that result in a fall in international  prices can still lead to welfare
increases. BL; careful analysis is required  on how productivity  or production  is increased  because  the
different  way in which productivity  or production  is increased  has different  irnplications  for the country's
welfare.
The relationship  between productivity  or production increase and welfare has been widely
discussed  in the economic  literature. 3 Any  productivity  and production  increase  can be classified  into  three
3 See  for  example,  Lindner  and  Jarrett  (1978)  and  Voon  and  Edwards  (1992).
27basic types depending  on the way it shifts the supply curve in a price-quantity  diagram-convergent,
paallel, and divergent.  (These  three  types are shown  in Figure 12.)
It is clear from Figure 12(a)  that the convergent  type of supply shift does not increase  production
but increases  farmers'  welfare  given  by the area abc. Because  this does  not increase  production,  it has no
impact  on the world  price. Hence  in this case  the question  of "adding-up"  problem  does not arise. It is a
pure case  where  the impact  is just on increasing  producer  surplus  of existing  producers. Such a shift can
occur, for example,  when research and extension  services  are concentrated  on efficient  farmers. Small
share-holders  are often assumed to be the least efficient  producers and programs that target efficient
producers  are opposed  on equity  grounds. This is may  be a mistaken  assumption  and careful consideration
should  be given  to the impact  of training  and extension  programs.
In the case of a  paral;el shift of the supply curve, the welfare gain is positive. The welfarc
comparison  is to be made between  the areas of triangles aPof and bP,g in Figure 12(b).  Because  thw
triangles  are similar  and  Pg > Pof,  area bPg > aPof. This type  of shift increases  supply  and hence  lowers
world  prices. This is the case when  all farmers  succeed  in reducing  production  cost by the same amount.
An example  of such  research  is the development  of yield-improving  planting  material.
The effect on welfare  is uncertain  in the case  of a divergent  supply  shift (Figure 12(c)). This type
of shift could  occur, for example,  if effort is given  to reducing  the production  costs of the less efficient
farmers  while  leaving  production  cost of the more  efficient  farrners  unchanged. In such a case, the price
decline  resulting from making the marginal  farmer more productive  can result in an overall decline  in
surplus. As a practical matter,  the instances  when  adding-up  effects  are significant  are exceedingly  rare.
Nonetheless,  unless off-st by increased  tax-rates (in which  surplus  gains go to the government  instead  of
producers)  programs  targeting  the least efficient  producers  can be counter-productive.
In countries  where an adding-up  problem  exists, extension  and research programs  which target
inefficient  farmers can generate  a policy dilemma  - especially  if the least-efficient  farmers are also the
poorest. In terms  of the optimal  tax, recall  that r = (p -C) Ip,  so that for the most marginal  farner,
most, if not all, of the increased  profits  arising  from cost-saving  extension  work  must be taxed away by the
28government.  Otherwise,  the country  will produce  in excess  of the optimal  level and total producar  surplus
will be reduced.
Fe.-unately, at a  practical level, there are few instances where countries face an adding-up
problem. St:ll,  in those few cases  where  the problem  does  exis., care should  be taken to recognize  that the
price-effect  of increased  production  reduces  the  value  of the service  to the marginal  farmer  when  inefficient
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Figure 12: Three  Types  of Production  Technical  Change.
caused by extension  and research  work which unduly emphasizes  traditional crops at the expense of
alternatives.
Finally,  when an adding-up  problem does exist, programs devoted  to area expansion,  such as
subsidized  planting  schemes  may  result  not only  in a misallocation  of land resources,  but may also result  in
welfare  losses. Unlike  the exarnple  of cost-reductions  for inefficient  farmen which can be off-set  through
increases  in the tax-rate,  area expansion  is likely  to result  in either constant  or increasing  narginal cosu.
In the presence  of an adding-up  problem,  the additional  quantities  reduce  prices as well, generating  a net
loss in government  and producer  surplus.
29Exchangates
In examining  appropriate exchange rate setting for countries whose major export itemns  vre
agricultural  commnodities  facing  an adding-up  problen, two critical facors need  to be taken into account-
exchange  rates of competing  countries  and the marginal  revenues  of the incremental  production  caused  by
the exchange  rate change.
As discussed  by Devarajan  CLn1  (1993),  the most common  approach  in practice  to estimating  the
equilibrium  exchange  rate is to calculate  the "purchasing  power  parity' (PPP) equilibrium  exchange  rate.
According  to this approach,  the equilibrium  nominal  rate is calculated  by equating  the inflation  adjusted
value  of the country's  currency  to that of trading  partners. As Devarajan "  point  out,  this  approach  has
major  flaws if there are major  changes  in relative  world  prices  of commodities  and in the equilibrium  level
of foreign  capital  inflows. For a country  whose  major  export  items  are  primary  comnnodities,  the relevant
comrarison  is between  the country's  real exchange  rate and thoce  of competing  countries.
An example  could  be an SSA countiy  whose  main  export  item is cocoa and its main destination  is
Western  Europe. Assume  that this country's  imports  consist  mainly  of capital  goods  from  Western  Europe.
According  to the PPP approach,  this country's  real exchange  rate should  follow  the real exchange  rate of
Western Europe.  However,  if real exchange  rates of other mnajor  cocoa producing  countries such as
Malaysia  and Indonesia  depreciate  significantly  relative  to Western  European  currencies,  the SSA country
will lose its competitiveness  in exporting  cocoa. The prime  consideration  in determining  the real exchange
rate level for such countries  therefore should be movements  in production  costs of the mnajor  export
commodities  as compared  with other  major  producing  countries  expressed  in a common  currency.
The ERV  is a critical  parameter  in evaluating  the exchange  rate of a country  that faces an adding-
up problem. For such  a country  that depends  heavily  on a single  export  commodity  and faces  a balance-of-
payment  problem,  a real devaluation  would  not help  to alleviate  the balance-of-payment  problem  unless  the
devaluation leads to the substantial expansion  of exports of other commodities. This is because  a
devaluation  would increase  supply  and hence  exports  of the traditional  commodity  but would  not increase
export revenues  much  due to the low ERV. In such countries,  it becomes  indispensable  to impose  a tax on
30the traditional  commodity  to enhance  the expansion  of other exports. From experience,  this is a common
situation  as the supply  response  of new exports  is very slow-most likely  because  investors  are unsure  that
the reform  policies  will  be long-lasting.
A devaluation  cannot  decicase  profitability  of producing  export  commodities.  For a given  output,
proportional  increase  in revenues  and costs will result in a proportional  increase  in profits.  In practice,
however,  a chaz.ge  in exchange  rates will affect  the relative  profitability  of alternative  production  methods.
A devaluation  increases  the price for imported  inputs such as pesticides,  machinery,  and some fertilizers
while  only indirectly  affecting  the price of "non-tradable"  inputs. Since  a variety of fanning methods  is
frequently  used within  a suigle  country,  the effect  of devaluation  on farm  profitability  will not be the same
for all farmers. To this extent,  changes  in relative  prices  have  an effect on supplies  sinmilar  to changes  in
the underlying  technology. If inputs are generally  imported,  and low-cost  producers  are input-intensive,
then an exchange  rate devaluation  tends to fltten  the supply curve. This would be a divergent  type of
production  increase  in Figure 12. Low-cost  producers  will see an upward  shift in costs and a decline  in
profits,  while  low-input  high-cost  producers  see little  change  in their (already  high)  costs. The devs!uation
in this circumstance  will lead to increased  production  since revenues  are increased  while  the effects on
marginal  costs are more  limited. Howcver,  a portion  of the producer  surplus previously  enjoyed  by the
high-input  users  is lost to increases  in input  prices. Alternatively,  if low-input  producers  are also low-cost
producers,  a devaluation  has an effect  similar  to the introduction  of a convergent  technology  of Figure 12
and low-cost  producers  will enjoy  an increase  in producer  surplus. Generally,  it is likely that relatively
high-input  technologies  are also low-cost. This is because  there  are no constraints  to not using  inputs if it
is cost-effective  to do so while  delivery  systems,  trade restrictions,  or lack of credit may all hamper  input
use even  when it is cost-effective. Care should  be taken however  in analyzing  the specific  technologies
available  in the country  and to recognize  the relationship  between  technologies,  exchange  rates,  and prices.
When low-cost  production  is also input-intensive, potentially  large gains in producer surplus may be
available  when obstacles  to input-use  are removed  for high-cost  producers  through credit or extension
programs. At the same  time, the potential  gains to such programs  may  be reduced when  the currency  of
the country  is constantly  devalued.
315. Concluding  Remarks
Tle  paper examined  agricultural  commodity  strategies for SSA countries  with a focus on the
adding-up  problem. The  adding-up  problem  has been raised  frequently  because  of the poor performance  of
SSA's agricultural  commodity  exports  and the increasing  concentration  of exported  commodities  in the last
15 years. However,  the analysis  shows that only a few countries  in SSA individually  face this problemn.
The problem  is a serious  one for Cote d'lvoire in cocoa, and exists in a less serious form for Ghana  in
cocoa,  Kenya  in tea, and burley  tobacco  in Malawi.
Some  analysts  discuss  the adding-up  problem  in terms  of SO  '  as a whole  and reasonably  conclude
there  is a problem  for cocoa,  coffee,  and tea. However,  it does not appear  feasible  to design  and implement
agricultural  commodity  production  and trade policies  for the region  as a whole  because  of the difficulty  in
coordinating  policies  to equitably  distribute  gains  among  SSA countries. In addition,  the analysis  suggests
that if SSA countries  agreed  to impose  the optimal  export  tax based on Sub-Saharan  Africa as whole,  the
greatest  benefit  would  go to producers  in other  regions  such as Latin America  and Asia. Recent  failures  of
intemational  commodity  agreements  and the disruption  caused by their discontinuation  highlight the
difficulties  of coordination  of trade  or production  strategies  among  countries  aimed  at raising  world  prices.
Some analysts hint that production of commodities  facing an adding-up problem should be
discouraged.  Instead,  these  subsectors  create  a resource  base that can be used by farmers  and governments
to create  dynamic  and diversified  agricultural  sectors. Given  that these  commodities  are often  the only cash
crops in which  the countries  have a comparative  advantage,  it would  be counter-productive  to design  an
agricultural  strategy based on discouraging  production  of these  commodities.
The few  countries  that do face a serious  adding-up  problem  need  to take specific  consiierations  in
designing  and implementing  policies  that affect  production  and exports  of the commodity  including:
(i)  Increasing  production  thru-ugh  costly  expansion  of land area should  be avoided. Such policies
would  likely  reduce  producer  surplus  of existing  farners because  of their negative  impact  on world
prices.
32(ii)  Efforts should  be made towards reducing  production  and nurketing costs.  If accompanied
where  appropriate  by an export  tax, this would  not lead to much  increase  in production  but would
increase  farmers'  profitability  and government  revenues.
(iii) The analysis  suggests  that when  an adding-up  problem  does  not exist,  a zero  export  tax would
be the most appropriate  policy for the long-term  benefit of the subsector. Alternatively,  when
countries  do face a serious  adding-up  problem, the imposition  of an export tax near the optinml
level  would  be the most  efficient  way  to limit  domestic  production. Because  the optirmal  export  tax
level  changes  with world  market conditions,  it is imperative  that the export tax level  be reviewed
frequently.  The analysis  in this paper shows  that precise calculation  of the optimal  tax rate is
frequently  not necessary  since  the primary  effect  of choosing  various tax rates in the neighborhood
of the optimal  level  is to allocate  revenue  between  producers  and the government.  Taxing exports
at a less-than-optimal  level often results in additional  revenue  for the agricultural  stor  without
affecting  total welfare.
(iv) Imposition  of an export  tax could  be desirable  if a country  facing  a serious  adding-up  problen
is to imnplement  a real devaluation  of its currency. One  of the most important  expected  effect of a
reed devaluation  is to adjust the balance-of-payments  toward equilibriun.  However, a  real
devaluation  would  increase  production  and exports  of the conmmodities  facing a severe adding-up
problem. Since increased  export quantities  do not increase  export revenues  when an adding-up
problem  exists, an export  tax on the commodity  could  be required  to enhance  export  revenues  by
diverting resources from traditional commnodities  which faces adding-up problem to  other
commodities.
(v)  Biases  which  favor  traditional  crops  should  be elirinated as well  as policies  which  penalize.
Diversification  can be encouraged  by providing  equal  access  to transportation  and extension
services  which  have  historically  favored  traditional  crops.
33Annex  Table  1: ERV, and  Optimal Tax of SSA Coutries  Producing  Coffee
Pzoduction  Production  Demand Elasticity  ERV  Optimal
Avcrage  Share in  Shre  in  Facing Counuy  Tax
1989  1990  1989 & 1990  SSA  World
(000 tons)  (000 tons)  (%)  (shou)  (long)  (shoft)  (long)  (O)
SSA  1235  1282  1258  100.0  20.7  -2.8  -5.01  0.64  0.80  20.0
Cote divoire  239  284  262  208  4.3  -14.8  -27.11  0.93  0.96  3.7
Ethiopia  200  204  202  16.1  3.3  -19.2  -35.36  0.95  0.97  2.8
Uganda  174  192  183  14.5  3.0  -21.3  -39.11  0.95  0.97  2.6
Zaire  107  98  102  3.1  1.7  -38.3  -70.49  0.97  0.99  1.4
Kenya  105  95  100  7.9  1.6  -39.3  -72.35  0.97  0.99  1.4
Cameroon  86  102  94  7.5  1.5  .41.6  -76.73  0.98  0.99  1.3
Madagascar  88  83  86  6.8  1.4  -45.9  -44.52  0.98  O.99  1.2
Tanzania  58  52  55  4.4  0.9  -71.9  -132.53  0.99  0.99  0.8
Rwanda  39  45  42  3.3  0.7  -93.8  -173.10  0.99  0.99  0.6
Burundi  32  35  33  2.6  0.5  -119.4  -220.19  0.99  1.00  0.5
Source: IECIT
34Annex Table 2: ERV, and Optimal  Tax of SSA Countries  Producing  Cocoa
|  Production  Production  Demand  Elasticity  ERV  Optima
Average  Share in  Sharc in  Facing onutry  Tax
1989  and 90  SSA  World
(000 tons)  (%)  (short)  (long)  (short)  (long)  (%)
SSA  1322  100.0  54.5  -0.8  -1.49  40.19  0.33  67.3
Cote dlvoire  723  54.7  29.8  -1.8  -3.46  0.4S  0.71  28.9
Ghana  271  20.5  11.2  -5.5  -10.76  0.82  0.91  9.3
Nigeria  158  11.9  6.5  -9.7  -19.12  0.90  0.95  5.2
Cameroon  123  9.3  5.1  -12.5  -24.77  0.92  0.96  4.0
Togo  8  0.6  0.3  -196.1  -'92.05  0.99  1.00  0.3
Equatorial  Guinea  8  0.6  0.3  -209.9  419.56  1.00  1.00  0.2
Sierra  Leone  7  0.5  0.3  -226.5  -452.76  1.00  1.00  0.2
Zaire  6  0.5  0.2  -260.3  -520.33  1.00  1.00  0.2
Sao  Tome A Principe  S  0.3  0.2  -350.0  -699.86  1.00  1.00  0.1
35Annex  Table  3: ERY, and  Optimal  Tax  of SSA  Countries  Producing  Cotton
Production  Production  Production  Demand  Elasticity  ERV  Opimal
Average  Shame  in  Share  in  Facing  Country  Tax
1989  and 90  SSA  Wold
(000 tons)  (000 tons)  (%)  (short)  (long)  (shod)  (long)  (V.)
SSA  957  100.0  5.4  4.0  -21.4  0.58  0.95  4.7
Sudan  121  12.6  0.7  -65.8  -175.2  O.9"  0.99  0.6
Cote d'ivoirm  I1  12.3  0.7  -67.5  -179.8  0.99  0.9  0.6
Mali  98  10.2  0.6  41.4  -216.9  0.99  1.00  0.5
Zimbabwc  81  8.5  0.5  -98.2  -261.9  o.9  1.00  0.4
Tanzania  71  7.4  0.4  -113.1  -301.4  0.99  1.00  0.3
Burkina  Faso  62  6.5  0.4  -128.1  -341.5  0.99  1.00  0.3
Chad  60  6.3  0.3  -133.0  -354.5  .99  1.00  0.3
Benin  47  4.9  0.3  -169.8  452.6  0.99  1.00  0.2
Cameroon  43  4.5  0.2  -183.7  -489.6  o."  1.00  0.2
Nigeria  35  4.0  0.2  -208.7  -556.3  1.00  1.00  0.2
TGO  34  3.6  0.2  -233.7  -623.2  1.00  1.00  0.2
36Annes  Table  4: ERV, and Optimal Tax of SSA Countries Producing Sugar
Production  Production  Demand  Elasticity  ERV  optimal
Average  Share  in  Share in  Facing  Countiry  Tax
1989  and 90  SSA  Wodd
(000  tons)  w/)  (shoit)  (long)  (shod)  (long)  )
SSA  3913  I,0.O  3.7  -17.3  -29.21  0.94  0.97  3.4
Mfauritius  596  15.2  0.6  -116.1  -196.38  0."  0.99  0.5
Swaziland  502  12.3  0.5  -133.0  -233.45  o.9  1.00  0.4
ndbabwe  497  12.7  0.5  -139.2  -235.55  0.99  1.00  0.4
Kenya  474  12.1  0.4  -146.3  -247.51  0.99  1.00  0.4
Sudan  400  10.2  0.4  -173.4  -293.47  o.9  1.00  0.3
Ethiopia  190  4.8  0.2  -365.3  .618.93  1.00  1.00  0.2
Mbaawi  176  4.5  0.2  -394.0  .666.76  1.00  1.00  0.1
Cote  d'Whire  141  3.8  0.1  -469.5  -794.43  1.00  1.00  0.1
Zambi  140  3.6  0.1  -497.6  -842.05  1.00  1.00  0.1
Madagascar  119  3.0  0.1  -582.1  -986.32  1.00  1.00  0.1
Tanzania  111  2.S  0.1  -625.5  -10S8.46  1.00  1.00  0.1
37Annex Tabk  5: ERV, and  Optdmal  Tax of  SSA Countries Producing  Budley  Tobacco
Production  Production  Demand  Elusticity  ERV  Optimal
Average  Share  in  Shae in  Facing  Country  Tax
1990  1991  l990 and 1991  SSA  World
(000 tons)  (000  tons)  ((shor)  (ong)  (showt)  (long)  (*V)
SSA  292.85  317.39  81.59  24.3  10.6  4.8  -7.9  0.79  0.87  12.6
Malawi  64.02  75.01  69.52  20.7  9.0  -6.2  -13.6  0.84  0.93  7.3
Zimbabwe  5.89  7.89  6.89  2.1  0.9  -66.8  -144.9  0.99  0.99  0.7
MAdagascar  1.55  1.55  1.55  0.5  0.2  -299.6  -649.4  1.00  1.00  0.2
Mozambique  1.15  1.15  1.15  0.3  0.1  -402.6  -872.7  1.00  1.00  0.1
Zambia  0.80  0.80  0.80  0.2  0.1  -579.0  -1,254.8  1.00  1.00  0.1
Zaire  0.66  0.66  0.66  0.2  0.1  -701.9  -1,521.2  1.00  1.00  0.1
Tanzania  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.2  0.1  -842.4  -I,B2S.5  1.00  1.00  0.1
Kenya  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.1  0.0  -1661.2  -3,612.5  1.00  1.00  0.0
Angola  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.1  0.0  -2317.6  -S.J21.6  1.00  1.00  0.0
SOURCE:  IECIT
38Annex Table 6: ERV, and Optimal Tax of SSA Countries  Producing Tea
Production  Demand Elasticity  ERV  Optimal
Average  Sharc in  Share in  Facing Counly  Tax
1989 and 90  SSA  World
(000  tons)  (000  tons)  ()  (short)  (long)  (short)  (long)  ()
SSA  299.4  100.0  16.3  -3.1  -6.04  0.6"  0.83  16.6
Kenya  188.8  63.1  10.3  -5.1  -9.99  0.S0  0.90  10.0
Malawi  39.2  13.1  2.1  -25.5  -50.73  0.96  O.9"  2.0
Tanzania  18.5  6.2  1.0  -54.3  -108.38  O.98  0.99  0.9
Zimbabwc  17.5  5.8  1.0  -57.5  -114.78  0.98  0.99  0.9
Rwanda  11.5  3.8  0.6  -87.9  -175.54  0.99  0.99  0.6
Mauritius  5.6  1.9  0.3  -179.1  -358.01  0.99  1.00  0.3
Uganda  5.6  1.9  0.3  -179.6  -359.01  0.99  1.00  0.3
Burundi  3.9  1.3  0.2  -259.3  -518.32  1.00  1.00  0.2
Zairc  3.1  1.0  0.2  -325.2  -650.25  1.00  1.00  0.2
Cameroon  2.6  0.9  0.1  -387.8  -775.43  1.00  1 00  0.1
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